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This article claims that within the framework of the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership, the Union mainly assumes the role of 
civilian power. Sometimes it also has to assume the political power 
role and becomes influential by using the attraction of full-
membership.  However, in cases like the conflict in the Middle 
East, where the Union still wants to be influential but the 
‘membership’ instrument cannot work, the Union displays a poor 
record. In such situations, institutionalisation of the security 
dimension of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership may help. 
 
Introduction 
 
Among the foreign policy choices before any international actor is 
that of determining its position on the isolationism-internationalism 
continuum. The ends of this range are marked by minimal (that is 
the isolationism end) and maximal (that is the internationalism end) 
participation in the international system. In the case of the 
European Union (EU), if taken as a unified entity acting as an 
international actor, it is difficult to pinpoint a precise value on this 
continuum as this value has changed considerably over time in 
terms of intensity, nature as well as according to the region of the 
world in question.  
 
In basic terms, it would not be wrong to claim that the EU has 
displayed a shift towards the internationalist end progressively. 
Until the beginning of the 1990s, the Union was more concerned 
with completing its political and economic integration process, and 
this process was indeed almost completed with some positive 
results like the Single Market and a single currency as scheduled. 
Since the Treaty of Maastricht, however, the Union has been trying 
to develop an effective common foreign and security policy with an 
internationalist shade. An almost simultaneous qualitative change 
in the nature of this process occurred in the sense that whilst the 
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scene until recently, there now are the signs of its aspiration to 
become a political power too. Some regions or country groups like 
the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states, the Balkans and 
the Mediterranean have been priority-areas in the Common Foreign 
and Security Policy (CFSP) of the Union. Among these, the 
Mediterranean exhibited a typical case since the relations between 
the Union and the countries of the region have always had a 
political aspect; different than the case of the other regions with 
which the Union has relations, since as early as the 1970s the 
Union established contacts with the Mediterranean countries which 
go beyond providing financial and technical assistance. Since then, 
the political/security element gradually gained importance and 
now, this article claims, it needs new instruments like a new 
organization to govern some issues in this realm. 
 
The Two Faces of the Foreign and Security Policy of the EU 
 
The sources that examine the EU as an international actor (for 
example (Duchéne, 1973),  (Hill, 1990), (Bretherton and Vogler, 
1999) or (Ehrhart, 2002))
1 draw attention to the fact that the 
European Community (EC) gave the impression of a civilian power 
in its first decades. That means that in its external relations the 
Community preferred quiet diplomacy, economic interdependence, 
multilateral connections and exchange. In concrete terms, it 
favoured persuasion to coercion; instead of solely relying on 
European institutions, it followed multiple media and fora of 
discussion; and finally, it pursued open diplomacy and encouraged 
public discussion of foreign policy matters (Hill, 1990: 31-35). 
 
Parallel to its ‘civilian power’ identity, the Community developed a 
‘political power’ identity. If we take political power literally and in 
its formal and institutionalised form, what we see is a series of 
scattered -and belated- attempts in the history of the Community in 
                                                 
1 The image of the Community as a civilian power was introduced to the 
literature first by Duchéne (1973). Then, after Bull’s (1982) criticism of the EC 
as a civilian power, Hill re-examined the question whether the EC was indeed a 
civilian power or a political power. 
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established the European Political Cooperation (EPC) mechanism 
which was based on mere foreign policy co-operation and co-
ordination. The Single European Act (SEA), then, constituted a 
legal basis for the EPC. Nevertheless, the result of the process has 
been the appearance of the (CFSP) of the Union as a separate and 
intergovernmental pillar with the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992. 
 
However, the ‘political power’ identity of the Community as a 
function thrived independently from and earlier and more 
remarkably than the inchoate institutional structures it was 
supposed to emanate from. Whereas the ‘civilian power’ identity 
presupposed that external relations be based on persuasion and 
negotiation, the Community started using its economic potency for 
political purposes; persuasion and negotiation were replaced by 
coercion and compulsion with economic means. Whilst there was 
no mention of foreign or security policy in the Treaty, the 
Community was devolved substantial powers in the field of 
external economic relations. Through the integration process based 
on the Treaty, a customs union was set up against the outside 
world, and a Common Customs Tariff was levied. The term 
‘fortress Europe’ was frequently used to denote the state of the 
Union in this period. The powers of the Community in the field 
continuously increased to include external representation and 
negotiation by the Commission in international trade matters. The 
external relations of the Community used “both carrots (offering or 
granting rewards) and sticks (threatening or inflicting non-violent 
punishment)” (Smith, 2000:38). 
 
Nonetheless, examples of the Community directing its political 
power in this sense specifically and conspicuously on a focal point 
are infrequent. A rare illustration of this kind may be the relations 
of the Community with the central and eastern European countries 
(CEECs). In the last decade, the Community arguably applied an 
imposition for them to accept specific development directions: an 
offer of membership was presented to them as a ‘carrot’ which was 
made conditional to some policy changes mainly on the basis of the 
Copenhagen criteria. This approach of the Community overlaps 
with the political power pattern of behaviour (Ibid.). 
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act as a political power, and if it is, whether it can do that each time 
by exploiting the appeal of full-membership. The Mediterranean 
policy of the Union will constitute a suitable and interesting case to 
inquire about these questions. 
 
EU’s Approach to the Mediterranean: A Civilian or Political 
Power? 
 
The origins of the Mediterranean policy of the Union go back to the 
year 1994. In June 1994, the European Council in Corfu decided to 
prepare a proposal for a Mediterranean policy. Since 1991, trade 
and aid relations between the Union and its Mediterranean 
neighbours had been overshadowed by the Union’s close relations 
with the CEECs. Moreover, the Union was trying to achieve the 
following specific objectives related to the region: preventing wars 
among the countries of the region, ensuring stabilization by 
reducing socio-political conflicts, obstructing exports of terrorism 
and drugs from the region, and impeding the flow of illegal 
immigration (Rhein, 1996: 77-78). In 1995, the ambitious Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) project was launched, and since 
then, the co-operation between the two parts has flourished to cover 
such areas like environment, science, technology and industry. 
However, this expansion in terms of content did not entail a 
comparable change in nature; in its Mediterranean policy as such 
the Union remained mainly a civilian power
2. Bretherton and 
Vogler (1999: 156) affirm this argument by stating that “(i)n the 
Mediterranean region, even where economic presence is 
substantial, as in relations with Israel and the Maghreb countries, 
this does not provide a basis for political influence”. In a more 
detailed fashion, Onursal says that the EMP bears all the 
characteristics of a civilian power approach: 
 
 
                                                 
2 An interesting view of the relations between the Union and the Mediterranean 
countries from this perspective, is that of Pace (Pace, 2002) who examines EU-
Mediterranean relations in the context of the concept of ‘otherness’. 
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structures in Mediterranean countries in order to encourage 
them to transform themselves into countries respectful of 
democracy, good governance and human rights. 
….  
 
•  The EMP has a multilateral and multidimensional 
framework which requires both vertical and horizontal 
action and co-operation. Besides bilateral agreements 
between the EU and each of the Mediterranean countries 
providing special status for Mediterranean Non-Member 
Countries (MNCs), there are regional arrangements among 
the Mediterranean countries which provide a framework for 
horizontal co-operation. 
…. 
 
With such a use of multiple avenues, the Community aims 
to prepare the ground for political dialogue to reduce 
conflicts and for closer relationships in a wide range of 
areas such as industry, energy, environment, and 
communication technologies. 
…. 
 
•  In order to reduce conflicts and misunderstandings inherent 
in the region, which have prevented any kind of co-
operation for years, various kinds of meetings are taking 
place in the EMP process
3: 
 
  Euro-Mediterranean Civil Forum is an open area 
of discussion for the future of the Mediterranean 
region and the partnership, and it has working 
groups making efforts for the development of 
regular contacts between the different 
dimensions established by the Barcelona 
Declaration. 
                                                 
3 The network of meetings and conferences has developed much since then (see 
(Bretherton and Vogler, 1999: 160-161) for a later account). However, this 
character of the system has not changed. 
  139  A Parliamentary Forum prospected, gathering 
the members of the EP, of the parliaments of the 
15 Member States, and of the parliaments of the 
12 Mediterranean partners.  
…. 
 
  Conferences among Foreign Ministers are 
organised periodically.  
….  
 
Consequently, the EMP process has the characteristics of the 
civilian model foreign policy of the EU which results from, 
according to Hill, the intellectual impact of a new model of 
interstate relations, the disposition of considerable economic 
influence over the management of international economy, the 
possession of a vast network of contacts and agreements with 
every region of the international system. (Onursal, 1997: 6-7) 
 
The post-Maastricht literature on Euro-Mediterranean relations 
includes pieces which may imply that the authors saw the Union 
taking on a political power status over the region. In 1997, Piening 
was claiming that the mode and especially the encompassing nature 
of the relations between the EC and the CEECs since 1989 had 
suggested that a similar approach may be reproduced for the 
Mediterranean (Piening, 1997: 80). Similarly, Bretherton and 
Vogler asserted that with the impetus gained from the Maastricht 
Treaty, from the experience with the CEECs -here they refer to 
Piening-, and from the positive atmosphere created by the progress 
-of the time- in the Middle East Peace Process, the Union may 
expand the scope of its approach towards the Mediterranean. 
 
But, these expectations have not been met and  the Union has 
preferred to deal with the so-called soft security issues
4 as by their 
                                                 
4 In the context of the Mediterranean, hard security issues can be listed as the 
conflicts in the Middle East, the conflicts between Turkey and Greece, the 
problem of weapons of mass destruction, and the security of energy supplies. 
Soft security issues, on the other hand are the need for economic co-operation, 
the flow of immigration, the environmental questions, and the problems related 
to terrorism, minorities and human rights. 
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managed by a civilian power approach. Soft security issues require 
lesser imposition of policies than in the case of hard security issues, 
and may be sorted out within the mechanisms described in the 
quotation from Onursal cited above. A group of writers believe that 
this group of issues should have priority in the Mediterranean 
agenda of the Union anyway. The famous think-tank the RAND 
Corporation, for example, holds that excessive emphasis on hard 
security issues is a simplistic depiction of the problems, and that 
the situation in the region is shaped more by political upheaval and 
socio-economic pressures, and by accompanying instability and 
tension (De Santis, 1998). In the same way, Busuttil points out that 
despite the armed conflicts in the Middle East and former 
Yugoslavia, security and its perceived absence should be viewed as 
much less military and much more socio-economic in nature 
(Busuttil, 1995: 129). If we are to agree with this view, we may 
deduce that the Union is equipped with the correct strategy. Indeed, 
if Aliboni is right, “(m)any Med partners agreed to the Euro-Med 
partnership not for its security elements, but because they saw it as 
a way to get economic and financial aid” (PMI, 1998: 9). 
  
Not denying the necessity and success of the civilian side of the 
issue, it may nevertheless be put forward that there are some issues 
in Euro-Mediterranean relations to the solution of which the EU 
cannot contribute by remaining in the confines of the civilian 
power approach. These problems are the disputes between Turkey 
and Greece, and the conflict in the Middle East. 
 
The disputes between Turkey and Greece mainly centre around the 
disputes over the Aegean Sea and Cyprus. These disputes -
especially the Cyprus problem- have been introduced into the 
agenda of the Union first, with the efforts of Greece (PMI, 1997: 
78) and also by the fact that all the parties (Greece, Turkey and 
Cyprus) are involved in the European integration process (Greece 
being a full-member since 1981,  Cyprus due to become a full-
member in May 2004, and Turkey a candidate state since 1999). In 
this context, it is unwarranted for the EU to assume a political 
power role in the issue. Actually, the EU is leading the issue into a 
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the political power rolé requires: 
 
Mr Jean Christophe Filori, Press Spokesman of the European 
Commissioner for Enlargement Mr Gunter Verheugen, 
replying to questions said that if there was still no peace 
settlement when the EU executive reported in December 2004 
on Turkey's own bid to open accession talks, it would be very 
difficult to recommend starting negotiations.  
 
"If by the time of the report at the end of 2004 there is still no 
settlement on Cyprus, we will be facing this rather weird 
situation where a candidate country knocking at the door does 
not recognise one of our own member states", he said.  
 
Asked whether the EU would consider part of its territory 
under illegal occupation after Cyprus' accession, Mr Filori 
replied: ''Yes, we can look at things in that way. This 
occupation has always been considered illegal by the 
international community, including the EU. Nothing changes 
there". (PIO, 2003)  
 
It is not surprising to see that yet another hard security issue to the 
solution of which the Union feels obliged to contribute is handled 
by using the allure of membership. We see a parallel here to the 
case of the CEECs.  
 
But the second main conflict that has a relevance to the 
Mediterranean Policy of the Union
5, the conflict in the Middle East 
seems more problematic for the Union since it technically does not 
permit the use of the decoy of membership: the parties involved in 
the conflict are simply non-European countries that have no 
prospect of membership of the Union. It is true that the EU has a 
major function in the Middle East Peace Process by providing 
political and economic support. In concrete terms this covers 
                                                 
5 The Middle East Peace Process is assumed separate but complementary to the 
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.  See the quotation from Europa below.  
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•  Facilitator in the Peace Process, notably through regular 
meetings with the main actors involved and visits by EU 
leaders …., by the EU Troika (present and incoming 
Presidency, the High Representative for CFSP, and the 
Commission) and the activities of the EU Special Envoy 
for the Peace Process, Ambassador Miguel Moratinos. 
The political talks with all parties, aimed at promoting 
the EU's positions, contribute to strengthen the role of 
the Union in the negotiations for the final settlement of 
the Israeli-Arab conflict.  
•  Frequent CFSP statements by the EU Presidency call 
upon the parties to overcome the stalemate of the 
process or support and welcome progress achieved. 
•  CFSP joint actions such as monitoring of the Palestinian 
elections of early 1996 and training of Palestinian 
policemen. 
•  Transatlantic dialogue and cooperation on the MEPP 
(resulting, inter alia, in the EU-U.S. Declaration on the 
Wye Memorandum, December 1998).  
•  Facilitator of regional dialogue through the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership. Although separate, the 
Barcelona Process and the Peace Process are 
complementary. Without the 1991 "Madrid Process", 
the Barcelona Process would not have been possible 
four years later in the present form. One of the 
successes of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership is to 
have allowed, against a tense background, dialogue to 
be pursued between Mediterranean Partners involved in 
the MEPP in a context of regional meetings on all 
questions of common interest. The Partnership still 
remains the only multilateral forum outside the United 
Nations where all the conflict parties meet. The 
Palestinian Authority is recognised as an equal 
Mediterranean Partner.  
•  The Euro-Mediterranean Charter for Peace and 
Stability, elaborated by senior officials of the 27 
partners dealing with political and security matters, will 
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stability in the region. This instrument, which will cover 
existing partnership-building or confidence-building 
measures, will give the EU a lasting political role in this 
conflict area.  
 
Economic support  
 
•  Largest donor of non-military aid to the MEPP: 179 
million euro a year on average over the past six years in 
direct support of the Palestinian Authority, refugees and 
regional Peace Process projects. With indirect support to 
the Peace Process (bilateral and regional aid) of more 
than 630 million euro to Israel's four neighbouring 
countries, the EU's total economic support on average 
goes beyond 810 million euro a year in EC grants and 
EIB loans (747 million euro in 1999).  
•  First donor of financial and technical assistance to the 
Palestinian Authority providing over 50% of the 
international community's finance for the West Bank 
and Gaza Strip between 1994 and 1998 (grants and 
loans of the EU and its Member States during that 
period total 1.5 billion euro). Together with Norway, the 
EU co-chairs meetings of the international donor 
mechanism, the Ad-Hoc Liaison Committee for 
Assistance to the Palestinians (AHLC). EU assistance, 
including from its Member States, as regular budget 
support to UNRWA for the benefit of Palestinian 
refugees totals 505 million euro in grants for 1994-
1998. Thus total aid to the Palestinians for the period 
1994-1998 accounts for 2 billion euro.  
•  First trading partner and major economic, scientific and 
research partner of Israel. 
•  Major political and economic partner of Lebanon, Syria, 
Jordan and Egypt.  
•  Gavel holder of the Regional Economic Development 
Working Group (REDWG) within the Multilateral 
Framework of the Peace Process and co-organiser of the 
working groups on environment, water and refugees.  
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cooperation in the framework of the Barcelona Process 
encourages integration and mutual understanding 
among the States and peoples of the region.  
•  Bilateral economic and financial cooperation with all 
parties involved in the MEPP (except Israel due to its 
high GDP level), provided through the MEDA 
Programme of the EU budget as one of the main 
instrument of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, 
creates the conditions for peace, stability and prosperity 
in the region.  
 
Besides the European Council and the EU Council, the 
European Commission plays a major role in shaping the 
EU's position and supporting its role.  (Europa, 2003a) 
 
Even the severest critic of the function of the Barcelona Process in 
the Middle East Peace Process would have to accept the estimable 
fact that within the activities of the Barcelona Process Israeli 
officials sit at the same table with their counterparts. The Special 
Envoy of the Union to the Middle East Peace Process, Miguel 
Angel Moratinos, draws attention to this fact, and is hopeful about 
the Union’s position about the future task of the Union in the 
Middle East. (PMI, 1998: 16-17). However, it is very obvious that 
the problem persists. It would of course be unjust to blame the EU 
for the failure of the international efforts to put out the blaze in the 
Middle East. It is also difficult to pinpoint the reasons for the 
inadequacy that lies on the EU’s part. But we may deduce the 
following points: 
 
1)  The general weakness of the CFSP of the EU: Instead of 
detailed arguments, it would suffice here to recall that 
the CFSP is rather based on the lowest common 
denominator principle, and is not backed up by a 
military capability. 
 
2)  The fact that EU-Middle East relations are mainly based 
on economic grounds: Both of the parties of the EU-
Middle-East affiliation prefer to base their relations on 
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Relations Commissioner, for example, an amelioration 
in the EU-Middle East relations first and foremost 
means an increase in EU’s spending on the area:  
 
I note the calls in both reports
6 for the EU to play a 
more active role in the Peace Process. Let us not 
underestimate our contribution. We are the major 
donor to the Palestinian Authority. Last year €155.6 
M was earmarked from the Community budget 
which included € 90 M for a special cash facility 
which I made available at the end of the year to 
preserve the institutional framework of the 
Palestinian Authority that we have helped to create 
and fund. And there are other ways in which we are 
raising our profile: J. Solana is an active member of 
the Committee established to find out the facts 
behind the recent troubles, and our Special Envoy, 
M. Moratinos, is in close touch with all the parties 
involved in seeking a settlement. (Europa, 2003b) 
 
Later on Mr. Patten illustrated the same fact with a 
meaningful title to an article he wrote for the Financial 
Times: “A Road Map Paid for in Euros” (Patten, 2003).  
 
Also, the Med partners agreed to the Euro-Med 
partnership not for its security elements, but because 
they saw it as a way to get economic and financial aid” 
(PMI, 1998: 9). 
 
What, then, would be an alternative strategy for the EU in dealing 
with the Middle East or with similar problems that may arise in the 
Mediterranean? Is there a way for the EU to be more effective in 
the region acting as a political power? The following section seeks 
to answer this question within a Mediterranean perspective. 
                                                 
6 Refers to the two reports prepared for a Common strategy for the 
Mediterranean and reinvigorating the Barcelona process. 
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Relations 
 
Today, the clash in the Middle East is probably the most 
problematic security issue on the agenda of EU-Mediterranean 
relations. But, since the Mediterranean region is rather a cluster of 
many different regions each having its own potential conflicts, it is 
difficult to ensure that no other conflicts will accompany the one in 
the Middle East; and it is not likely that the Union will be able to 
use the attraction of membership to extinguish them. Biad divides 
the possible conflicts in the region
7 into two categories. His first 
category is “constituted by territorial and border disputes such as 
those between Israel and Palestine, Israel and Syria, Israel and 
Lebanon, Greece and Turkey, Turkey and Syria, Egypt and Sudan, 
Spain and Morocco and those in the Western Sahara” whereas his 
second category is “represented by ethno-cultural rivalry as in the 
former Yugoslavia, Cyprus, and that which is part of the Kurdish 
question” as well as “the low-intensity violence of terrorism in 
Algeria and Egypt” (Biad, 1999). 
 
One way to prevent such conflicts is to bring in a new institutional 
structure. The introduction of such a structure can be justified by at 
least four arguments: 
 
1) The current presence of the USA in Iraq and the reaction 
displayed against this situation by both the indigenous people of 
Iraq as well as by many of the countries of the world, should now 
forbid Western powers from appearing ‘invasive’. Biad had given 
an appropriate warning, saying that in the framework of the 
relations with the Mediterranean countries, 
 
response to a security threat should not be based on an imposed 
formula that carries with it the risk of being perceived as 
intrusive in the eyes of the southern countries. Rather, such a 
response should be based on a co-operative approach that 
                                                 
7 For an alternative and detailed account of alternative lists of possible risks that 
the EU may face from the Mediterranean region see (Tanner, 1999). 
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(Biad, 1999) 
 
A Euro-Mediterranean security organisation would be a venue 
where the security problems of the region will be discussed in the 
presence of all the parties involved. 
 
2) To complement the previous point, the establishment of such an 
organisation will also serve some practical aims as well. Calleya’s 
criticism of the Euro-Mediterranean  Partnership process in general 
is valid in this context too. He says that this Partnership is “too 
centred on Brussels, and a Mediterranean pole must be created to 
balance the relationship and to eliminate neo-colonial 
tendencies….” (PMI, 1998: 10). 
 
3) The cleavage between the USA and some of the Member States 
of the Union once again casts doubts over the transatlantic 
connection of the European security structure. Considering the fact 
that the Union is still short of the necessary military might to 
intervene in conflicts, the importance of preventing conflicts before 
they break out becomes apparent. An institutional structure seems 
likely to be helpful to this aim. 
 
4) The option of including the Middle Eastern countries in the 
existing organisations is not possible in many cases as “many 
countries in Central and Eastern Europe, or even in Central Asia 
and the Middle East, passionately desire to join the EU or NATO 
but do not fit -economically, militarily or politically” (Calleo, 
2001). 
 
There have already been some efforts to institutionalise the security 
dimension of Euro-Mediterranean relations. These include the 
OSCE/CSCE, the Euro-Arab Dialogue, the Five+Five
8, CSCM, the 
ACFIS and the Mediterranean Forum. However, for some reason 
                                                 
8 France, Italy, Malta, Spain and Portugal on one side and Algeria, Libya, 
Morocco, and Tunisia on the other side. 
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conflict prevention.
9
 
In fact, the Barcelona Declaration itself also contained the seed for 
such a mechanism to develop: The Action Plan for the 
Development of the Political-Security Chapter of the Barcelona 
Process identified six priority areas: 
 
•  Enhancement of stability and reinforcement of democratic 
institutions, 
•  Preventative diplomacy and good neighbourly relations, 
•  Confidence and security-building measures,  
•  Ways and means of arriving at regional security and an 
arms control and disarmament arrangement, 
•  Prevention of and fight against terrorism, 
•  Fight against organised crime (Marquina, 1999) 
 
To realise these aims, four operational mechanisms were proposed: 
 
•  The establishment of communication networks among focal 
points, 
•  Strengthening dialogue as an early warning procedure (by 
setting up a Euro-Situation Centre) and establishing a 
dispute prevention mechanism. 
•  Appointing conciliators to facilitate political conciliation 
procedures, 
•  Peaceful settlement of disputes by Euro-Med instruments. 
(Ibid.) 
 
These proposed mechanisms are criticised by Marquina as being 
“purely diplomatic”, and having a “short-term” and “voluntary” 
basis. Indeed, throughout the four years since Marquina’s article 
nothing much has come out of these mechanisms. 
 
The exigency for institutionalising the security side of the Euro-
Mediterranean relationship on the one hand, and the failure of the 
                                                 
9 For more information on these attempts and their failure, see (Biad, 1999) and 
(Marquina, 1999). 
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academics alike to put forward proposals. These proposals extend 
from setting up of an over-arching security organisation to 
establishing a more modest conflict prevention centre. 
 
According to Armand de Decker, the chairman of the Belgian 
Senate, the EU should form a kind of cordon sanitaire
10 in the 
Mediterranean. A new security organisation that will emulate the 
NATO with its secretariat and parliamentary assembly, in his 
opinion, is the best instrument to ensure security in the 
Mediterranean. In a generally critical tone against the American 
approach to the developments in the Middle East, de Decker 
maintains that, this organisation can be called “the Euro-
Mediterranean Alliance” and should welcome the access of all the 
coastal countries of the Mediterranean. (Gorus, 2003: 37) 
 
Abdullah Toukan, an advisor to King Hussein of Jordan, has a 
more moderate blueprint. He aims at preventing conflicts before 
they arise. He 
 
envisions a Conflict Prevention Centre as a regional forum for 
policy-makers to address a wide range of non-military security 
related issues such as energy, water, demography, human rights 
and the environment. To shape the relations between 
participating states, Toukan proposes following the general 
guidelines of Article VIII of the United Nations Charter as well 
as the more specific codes of conduct set out in the Helsinki 
Final Act. Toukan notes that working with Europe, by building 
on its experience through the Organisation for Security and Co-
operation in Europe (OSCE), would provide an important link 
between Middle Eastern and European Security. (Toukan, 
1997: 80) 
 
The four requirements mentioned above for an institutionalised 
form of Euro-Mediterranean partnership can be satisfied by the 
proposals of de Decker and Toukan both, or anything in between at 
                                                 
10 De Decker does not use the term cordon sanitaire. But his idea seems to fit the 
term. 
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organisation. De Decker’s suggestion may seem pretentious, but we 
should remember that it was the idea of European integration itself 
which was once scorned. Toukan’s side, on the other hand, may 
also be criticised as having the defect of remaining ineffective in 
the face of real threats. However, taking into consideration the 
differences of opinion, needs and capabilities both among the 
Member States of the EU as well as among the Mediterranean 
countries, such modest proposals seem more likely to survive and 
function. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The Union aspires to become more internationalist as it gets more 
integrated. Yet, it is a fact that the oft-quoted flaws of the CFSP 
prevent the Union from getting as internationalist as it desires. The 
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership is an exceptional case in this 
context since 
 
1)  The Union is able to evade the restrictions of the CFSP by 
pursuing a civilian power approach towards many of the 
Mediterranean countries; instead of leading them in specific 
directions, it chooses a mode of relationship based on co-
operation, dialogue and assistance; 
 
2)  In the case of the issues where the civilian power approach 
is short of engendering the desired effect, the Community 
resorts to the political power approach and uses full-
membership as a ‘carrot’. This strategy did work in the case 
of the CEECs - outside the Mediterranean region - and to 
some extent in that of Turkey - in the Mediterranean; 
 
3)  However, there are - and may be in the future- some cases 
where the civilian power approach is still inadequate but at 
the same time full-membership is no enticement. The 
conflict in the Middle East is an example of this; and 
 
4)  In the cases mentioned in the previous point, establishing 
some institutional mechanisms at Euro-Mediterranean level 
  151would serve some aims: the Mediterranean countries, 
having an equal say, will not feel coerced or manipulated; 
the unidirectional and centralist nature of the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership will gain a more balanced 
structure; the institution will be a forum where conflicting 
parties will have the opportunity to come together; and 
there will be an opportunity for the Union to obviate direct 
American involvement in the region in the long-run. 
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